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The CEE countries’ first decade of EU membership: 
From policy-takers towards agenda-setters? 
 
Abstract 
The accession of the group of eight post-communist Central and Eastern European member 
states who joined in 2004 marked a historic watershed in the development of the European 
Union. The subsequent enlargements in 2004 and represented the biggest expansion of the 
EU’s membership base since the beginning of the institutionalised process of institutional 
European integration after the end of WW2. Even more importantly however, it constituted the 
official end of more than four decades in which the European continent had been artificially 
divided into two ideological and military blocs by the Cold War. This article concentrates on 
the 2004 enlargement and analyses how the CEE-8 group has integrated into the EU’s 
institutional and policy acquis over the past decade. In this respect the impact of the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 represents a major challenge for the countries of the region in their 
ongoing political, economic and social transformation since the fall of communism. The paper 
examines to what extent the CEE countries have managed to tackle the multiple challenges of 
post-communist transition and which factors have determined their status as predominantly 
passive policy-takers. Special emphasis is put on the impact of the 2008-09 global financial 
crisis, which poses the risk of backsliding on the CEE's domestic political and economic 
transition process and growing alienation from the increasingly complex new coordinative EU 
policy mechanisms. The article also considers the potential future role of the semi-
institutionalised cooperation amongst the Visegrád 4 group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia) in effectively promoting the interests of the wider CEE region in the EU. The 
main challenge in this respect lies in the persistent diversity of national interests and varying 
levels of commitment towards transnational cooperation amongst the V4 and the wider CEE 
group. This especially applies to the regional leader Poland who has been torn between the 
ambition to intensify regional cooperation and the desire to become a leading player in the EU 
along the side of France and Germany.  
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Introduction 
 
Since its foundation under the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the European 
Community steadily grew from the original six member states towards nine in 
1973, 12 in the 1980s and 15 in 1995. The most recent historic enlargements 
towards Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe substantially enlarged the 
EU towards 25 in 2004, 27 in 2007 and most recently 28 member states when 
Croatia joined in 2013. This article examines how the 2004 and 2007 CEE 
accession groups have integrated into the EU and how their status has been 
affected by changing internal dynamics. The article also considers the potential 
role of the Visegrád 4 cooperation in strengthening the voice of the CEE region 
in the EU's process of intergovernmental strategic bargaining.  
 
The 2004/07 enlargements - a historic 'big bang' expansion of the EU 
 
The historic enlargement of the EU towards eight new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 marked the end of sixty years of artificial 
Cold War ideological division of the European continent. Leading voices 
amongst the EU-15 governments, such as the British prime minister Tony Blair 
and the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, strongly supported the decision 
to allow a whole group of CEE countries to join the EU in a single enlargement 
wave. Blair spoke of 'equal partners' joining who would help to build a 'new 
Europe' (Blair 2000). Schröder emphasised that the CEE-8 group who joined in 
May 2004 are countries who 'are finally returning to Europe's community of 
state, to the European family' (Schröder 2004).  
 
The CEE pre-accession process: Strict conditionality 
 
The pre-accession process was nevertheless dominated by public 
discussions in the EU-15 which concentrated on the extent to which the 
prospective member states would be prepared to join the EU's acquis and what 
the overall implications for the EU's internal dynamics would be. The special 
Eurobarometer which was conducted by the European Commission in the EU-
15 countries one year before the accession date for the CEE-8 in March 2003 
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showed that around 80 per cent of all citizens in the existing member states 
were aware that the EU's membership base was about to be expanded 
substantially. The poll also showed that the majority of citizens in the existing 
member states considered the EU not well prepared for the big bang 
enlargement consisting of the CEE-8 plus Cyprus and Malta in May 2004. In 
the 48 per cent of citizens in the EU-15 countries considered the EU not to be 
ready for the next wave of enlargement. In France, Italy and Germany this 
stood even higher with 51, 52 and 48 per cent of the population respectively 
expressing this view (European Commission 2003, p. 9 and p. 80). This  was a 
reflection that the EU-15 governments had failed to reach a consensus on EU 
institutional and procedural reform before enlargement actually took place. 
None of the major intergovernmental conferences on treaty reform since 
Maastricht had managed to achieve a breakthrough to establish an institutional 
status quo which could ensure that the EU remained operational after the next 
enlargement. The stony road of post-Maastricht reform discussions from 
Amsterdam in 1997 to Nice in 2000 and Laeken in 2001 was characterised by 
the persistent gap between national government rhetoric and action (Grabbe 
and Hughes 2000, p. 104). At Laeken the EU-15 governments had reached the 
point where they had to concede that major reforms could not be reached in 
intergovernmental negotiations (European Council 2001). It therefore 
ultimately fell to the Constitutional Convention which was only established in 
2001 to work towards an EU reform treaty. The Convention under the 
leadership of former French president Giscard d'Estaing gave EU governments 
breathing space but as  it did not start its work until February 2002 it was clear 
that a reform treaty proposed by the Convention could not be completely 
ratified before the May 2004 accession date. 
The relatively fruitless reform discussions amongst EU-15 political 
elites on institutional and procedural reform took place against the background 
of substantial public concerns regarding the financial, economic and social 
impact of the forthcoming enlargement. Once the shape of the impending 
eastward enlargement was determined in detail, the public debate shifted 
towards the potential impact the accession of a large group of post-communist 
countries on the economies and societies of the EU-15. Parallel concerns about 
the potential financial burden had previously been addressed during the Agenda 
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2000 enlargement package negotiations under the German EU presidency in 
the first half of 1999. The European Council meeting in Berlin on 24/25 March 
1999 effectively determined a spending cap of €213 billion for the period 
2000-2006 on the EU's structural and procedural funds (EUR-Lex 1999). At 
the same time the Berlin Council summit decided to limit the pre-accession 
instruments for the group of ten CEE candidate countries (including Romania 
and Bulgaria) and also Cyprus to €3.1 billion per year between 2000 and 2006. 
Expenditure for the actual accession was limited to €45.2 in total, in both cases 
including agricultural spending (European Council 1999). The CEE candidate 
governments accepted this financial settlement, which left them substantially 
worse off than accession candidates during previous enlargements, without 
much public resistance. It was nevertheless expected that some of them, 
especially Poland, would demand for an increase in the overall budgetary 
provision for post-accession financial support once they had joined the EU 
(Barysch and Grabbe 2002, p. 26).  Overall the public view prior to the 2004 
enlargement in the EU-15 was that the expansion of the EU’s membership base 
would result in a significant burden on the national budgets. 68 per cent of 
citizens in the EU-15 expressed the opinion that this enlargement would be 
‘very expensive’, in France and Germany over 70 per cent of the population 
voiced such concerns (European Commission 2003, p.44).  
One issue that gained increasing prominence in the public debate 
around the preparation for the May enlargement was that of expected high 
levels of labour migration from the CEE countries. The majority of citizens in 
most of the EU-15 countries expected this enlargement to result in the influx of 
a large number of people from the new member states. Between 60 and 80 per 
cent of the population expressed such an opinion in most member states, with 
the exception of the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and the 
Netherlands were the levels of public concern were lower. In a number of EU-
15 countries there was also the expectation that the enlargement would lead to 
rising levels of unemployment (Portugal: 64 per cent, Spain: 62 per cent, 
Germany: 56 per cent, Luxembourg: 53 per cent and Austria 51 per cent) and 
that the standard of social welfare would decline, (Germany: 56 per cent, 
Portugal: 52 per cent, Spain: 50 per cent) (Eurobarometer 2003, p. 60 and p. 
69-70). The background to this were the high levels of unemployment in some 
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of the CEE-8 accession candidates. The major concern amongst the group was 
Poland, were unemployment had approached 20 per cent by 2002-03 (see 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Total unemployment rate CEE-10 candidate countries  
                2000-2004 
 
Source: Eurostat, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pco
de=tsdec450&plugin=1 
 
The bleak labour market situation in many of the CEE-8 accession 
group combined with a noticeable gap in the wage structure between these 
countries and the EU-15 pushed concerns about the potential impact of a large 
wave of labour migration to the forefront in the run-up to the May 2004 
enlargement. This 'race to the bottom' debate portrayed unfair wage 
competition from the East as the potential death knell for long established 
Western European social standards, essentially the European social model 
(Barysch 2006, p. 1). It was based on the observation that the 'economic 
earthquake' of transition from centrally planned state socialism towards 
economic liberalisation resulted in noticeable detrimental social effects in the 
CEE region (Engbersen, Okólski, Black and Pantîru 2010, p. 19). These 
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concerns were augmented by the fact that the May 2004 enlargement 
(including Cyprus and Malta) represented the biggest expansion of the EU's 
population ever, with over 71 million new citizens joining the Single Market in 
one instant, representing an almost 20 per cent relative increase of the EU’s 
population. At the same time the group of new member states only reached 
around 25 per cent of the EU’s GDP per capita, which was substantially lower 
than any of the previous accession countries (Kvist 2004 , p. 304). The 
majority of national governments in the EU-15 reacted to these concerns by 
demanding that the accession treaty for the May 2004 enlargement determined 
the ability to impose national transitional periods of up to seven years up 
during which the freedom of movement for the new member states would be 
limited (European Commission 2004). As a result twelve of the EU-15 decided 
to impose temporary restriction to the freedom of movement for citizens from 
the CEE-8. The exceptions were the United Kingdom and Ireland, whose 
considered enlargement as an opportunity to fill vacancies in their booming 
labour markets with migrant and after some deliberation also Sweden (Dobson 
and Sennikova 2007, p. 124). 
The CEE countries faced strict conditionality as part of their accession 
process. The Copenhagen membership criteria, which the EU had determined 
for future members back in 1993, where applied in a more stringent manner 
towards the assessment of the CEE membership application than this had been 
the case during previous enlargement. This reflected the numerous concerns 
the EU had towards the accession of a large group of predominantly post-
communist member states (Goetz 2005, p. 256). Beyond the issues outlined 
earlier in this article the EU-15 governments and the Commission were 
adamant to ensure that the CEE countries would make sufficient progress in 
their ongoing domestic political and economic transformation to be able to fit 
into the EU acquis smoothly. The accession process, which has generally been 
described as one of external governance through conditionality, is based on the 
incentives that come with EU membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2011). In the case of the CEE countries this conditionality manifested itself in 
the emphasis on political conditionality, especially a relative broad definition 
of good governance (Sedelmeier 2015, p. 427). This allowed the EU adopt a 
'regatta' approach where preference for accession was given to those countries 
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who were considered to be most advanced in their progress of approximation 
towards the EU acquis. Romania and Bulgaria and the Balkan countries were 
hence left out from the 2004 accession group because they were considered to 
have made insufficient progress on political criteria such as reducing 
corruption, administrative inefficiency and the fight against organised crime  
(Bojkov 2004: 518-519). This was almost ironic given the fact that especially 
the Southern members in the EU-15 group, most of all Italy and Greece, have  
persistent problems with administrative inefficiency, clientelism and 
corruption
1
. One could therefore argue that this strict and broadly defined 
conditionality on behalf of the EU towards the CEE countries, which by far 
exceeded the accession demands placed on previous applicants, essentially 
treated them as second class members (Aslund 2010, p. 8). This was 
accentuated by their exclusion from the core Single Market principle of the free 
movement of people for quite extensive periods in some of the EU-15 
countries. This contradicted the principle of equal treatment for all member 
states, which the EU previously had consistently applied, and de facto at least 
temporarily created a two-tier EU (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker 2001,  
p.74). 
 
After accession: the CEEs as 'good citizens' in times of crisis 
Those that had predicted that the accession of eight post-communist 
countries would result in the major disruption of the EU's business were proven 
wrong. In spite of the widespread concerns about the potential adverse impact 
of allowing a relatively large group of post-communist transition countries to 
join at once, the CEE countries’ overall conduct in the EU after accession was 
largely constructive.  
 
Integrating into the EU’s acquis 
The majority of the CEE-8 complied with the EU's strict monitoring 
regime towards their performance in terms of the transposition of EU’s acquis. 
Exceptions were Poland under the Justice and Law government during the 
                                                          
1
 The Demos Democracy Index ranks Greece and Italy as the third and fourth worst  
   performers on the control of corruption and implementing the rule of law in the EU 
   (Demos 2013, p. 101 and 104). 
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period 2005-2007,  the Czech Republic during the era of president Václav 
Klaus (2003-2013) and more recently Hungary under the second and third 
Orbán government since 2010. Once they had joined the EU, the CEE-8 
therefore largely demonstrated ‘good citizenship’ (Dimitrov 2012).Concerns 
nevertheless remained about the actual gap between formal transposition and 
actual domestic implementation of EU law, especially in the area of social 
policy, in its intended spirit. The basis for this concern about ‘dead letters’ 
emerging from the transposition process focused on the lack of effective 
institutional capabilities and  mechanisms of scrutiny from a functioning civil 
society (Falkner and Treib 2008). The overall official transposition record of 
the CEE countries nevertheless remained better than in many of the EU-15 
member states. In practice the CEE countries restricted themselves to the 
position of passive policy takers who did not actively challenge the political 
status quo in the EU (Dimitrov 2012, p. 298) and displayed a good record on 
compliance with EU law transposition (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). In its 
July 2005 Internal Market Scoreboard the European Commission praised the 
CEE-8 countries for the better performance 'in transposing Internal Market 
directives on time than the EU-15 Member States, despite having had to absorb 
the whole acquis in a short time frame' (European Commission 2005, p.5). 
After Romania and Bulgaria had joined the EU in 2007 they showed a 
similarly good transposition record. Both countries have however subsequently 
been accused of 'post-accession hooliganism' due to their alleged backtracking 
on governance reform (Ganev 2013). The CEEs good transposition record, 
especially in the area of Single Market directives, can to a large extent be 
explained by the fact that the EU policy agenda in fact coincided with the 'post-
Communist dynamic of democratisatization, marketization and liberalization' 
(Goetz 2005, p. 259). The CEE countries therefore generally have shown much 
stronger support for the EU Single Market liberalisation and reform agenda 
than many of the EU-15 who keep displaying a noticeable and persistent 
commitment-implementation gap (Schweiger 2014, p. 24).  
 
 
 
Economic transformation under the conditions of the eurozone crisis 
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Before the onset of the global financial crisis the CEE-8 group had also 
made significant progress in its economic transformation. All of the CEE 
member states, including the later joiners Bulgaria and Romania, displayed 
good levels of economic growth between 2004 and 2008. The highest level of 
growth could be seen in the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who 
had swiftly opened their economy to foreign FDI, especially in the area of 
financial services, and also in Slovakia (Farkas 2013, p. 67). The exception was 
Hungary, one of the countries amongst the CEE group who immediately after 
the fall of the iron curtain had initially shown a good record of economic 
transition. Hungary had maintained a greater level of economic liberalisation 
than other Warsaw Pact countries under communism and developed a strongly 
‘outward orientated’ economic transition model which relied heavily on the 
attraction of foreign direct investment (Pogátsa 2009, p. 597). Hungary 
however quickly became trapped in a vicious circle of sluggish economic 
growth, rising levels of public debt and an imbalanced two-tier economy, 
which relied heavily on dwindling foreign investment and failed to build up a 
viable domestic base for growth (Kovács 2015, p. 133). Hungary’s dependence 
on FDI was not uncharacteristic for the post-accession development of the 
wider CEE group.  
While the Baltic countries’ FDI was originally more orientated towards 
Scandinavia, especially the Visegrád-4 countries the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia quickly established themselves as manufacturing hubs for 
the German automobile industry (Galgoczi 2009, p. 623), which has become an 
essential but certainly not the only pillar of their economy. The strong 
dependence on externally financed growth generally poses a risk for the long-
term economic stability in the CEE region. This was reflected by the sharp 
downturn in the Baltic states following the onset of the global financial crisis in 
2008-09. Especially for the V4 group, with the exception of Hungary, the close 
affiliation with the German economy which managed to maintain a good 
export performance during the crisis, turned out to be beneficial. The prime 
example for this is Poland, who turned out to be the only country in the whole 
of the EU that did not fall into recession at any time during the financial crisis 
and the subsequent eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The Polish government was 
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able to use its comparative advantage of being closely connected with 
Germany's economy in combination with targeted investment, which was 
substantially funded from the EU budget, to steer the country's economy 
successfully through the crisis (Duszczyk 2015). Poland's recent economic 
success cemented its role as the leader amongst the CEE group and supported 
the leadership ambitions that the Civic Platform government under the 
leadership of prime minister Donald Tusk had set out for the country after it he 
became prime minister in 2011. Under the Tusk government Poland managed 
to overcome its initial position as economic and political problem case amongst 
the 2004 accession group. It had emerged on the basis of the mounting 
domestic unemployment problem and the nationalist and eurosceptic 
demeanour of the Law and Justice Party government between 2005 and 2007. 
During this period Poland adopted the role of an obstructive player in the EU. 
It tried to undermine the negotiations on the emerging Constitutional Treaty 
and challenged what the government perceived as the EU's 'liberal consensus' 
(Szczerbiak 2012,  p. 17). In stark contrast to this approach, the successor Civic 
Platform government which won power in 2007, made efforts to rebuild 
relations with EU partners. Civic Platform prime minister Donald Tusk openly 
expressed the ambition to turn Poland into ‘a central player’ in the EU and to 
ultimately join the Franco-German strategic leadership axis as part of the 
cooperation in the ‘Weimar triangle’.  
For this purpose the Tusk government developed close relations with 
Germany and openly advocated a German leadership role in the EU (Sikorski 
2011). Joining the euro was promoted as a core strategic goal of the Tusk 
government to enhancing Polish influence in the EU. Radoslaw Sikorski, who 
was foreign minister in Civic Platform governments between 2007 and 2014, 
emphasised this: ‘Even though we are already a member-state to be reckoned 
with, to further boost our significance we should be ready to adopt the euro.’ 
(Sikorski 2013). This clearly distinguished Poland from the rest of the CEE 
group who refrained from actively trying to shape the EU policy agenda. Even 
the Polish government has however struggled to enhance the country’s 
influence in the EU under the lingering conditions of the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. The Tusk government had originally planned to adopt the euro by 
2012 (Schweiger 2013, p. 13) but was faced with the reality that the Stability 
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and Growth Pact criteria could not be met under the conditions of the economic 
crisis, where targeted investment became crucial to steer the country clear of 
recession. Poland had met the eurozone SGP annual borrowing target in 2007, 
when it borrowed less than three per cent of its annual GDP. By 2009/10 this 
had increased to over seven per cent. Although Poland's overall deficit has also 
risen under the conditions of the financial crisis (from 45 to 55 per cent of the 
GDP), it still is within the 60 per cent SGP deficit limit (Eurostat 2015). The 
government led by Tusk's successor Ewa Kopacz has therefore adopted a 'wait 
and see' approach towards the eurozone entry (Goetting and Sobczak 2014). 
Even if Poland would meet all the SGP entry criteria, including the targets on 
inflation, the Polish government now faces an increasingly sceptical Polish 
public when it comes to eurozone entry. The persistent crisis symptoms in the 
eurozone have eradicated the slim but steady public support for euro entry in 
Poland, which had established itself before the financial crisis in 2006/07 
(European Commission 2007, p. 37). The latest Eurobarometer opinion polls 
conducted in March 2015 show that a clear majority of Poles is now against 
economic and monetary union (54 per cent) and only 10 per cent consider the 
euro to be the most positive result of European integration (European 
Commission 2015, p. 26). This explains why already in 2013 Tusk committed 
himself towards holding a referendum on eurozone entry (Sobczak 2013).  
The eurozone has witnessed continuous enlargement during the period 
of its most existential crisis. The new member states who joined between 2007 
and 2015 were all from the 2004 enlargement group, including Cyprus and 
Malta. The accession of Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), 
Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) to the euro core group during this period 
reflects the remarkable economic transformation process these countries were 
able to achieve within more or less a decade since they had first joined the EU. 
This was even more so the case as these countries were confronted with the 
stricter appliance of the stability and growth pact criteria by the European 
Commission than this had been the case during the establishment of the 
original eurozone core between 1999 and 2001. Then Southern European 
countries with significant structural public deficits of over 100 per cent of their 
GDP were admitted. Moreover, the initiators of EMU's original design, 
Germany and France, became the first to break the SGP deficit criteria 
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(Hodson 2015, p. 175). The political developments in the eurozone since the 
onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2008/09 have made entry for the current 
CEE outsiders far less attractive than it was a decade ago. With increasing 
levels of supervision of national budgetary and macroeconomic policies by the 
European Commission under the new European Semester cycle of policy 
coordination, eurozone countries facing further constraints on their sovereign 
policy-making autonomy. Moreover, under German leadership the eurozone 
has established a financial support system which requires solvent countries to 
act as debtors for members with solvency problems under the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) loan system. CEE outsiders such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are therefore asking themselves 'whether 
it is possible to strengthen the economic security of a country by joining the 
EMU which is unstable and faces the problem of insolvency of its member 
states' (Stryjek 2013, p. 59). Figure 2 illustrates the stark difference between 
budgetary situation of the CEE countries and the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) eurozone countries. Even Hungary, which continues to 
struggle to bring its public finances under control and the recent problem case 
Slovenia, have a relatively sound budgetary situation when compared with the 
GIIPS.  
 
Figure 2: General government gross debt (% of GDP) in the CEE 
                member states and the GIIPS group 2011-2014 
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Source: Eurostat, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pco
de=tsdde410&plugin=1 
 
It is therefore no surprise that both the CEE insiders and the outsiders 
have been critical towards the political mechanisms the eurozone has adopted 
in response to the sovereign debt crisis. In this respect the eurozone crisis 
represents a turning point for some of them. The CEE countries have generally 
been supportive of Germany's insistence on fiscal rigidity in response to the 
crisis (Handl and Paterson 2013, p. 332). As part of their role as predominantly 
passive policy-takers they have also not tried to challenge the EU's post-crisis 
policy status quo, which confronts governments with the increasing dilemma of 
having to meet the eurozone SGP and now also the Fiscal Compact budgetary 
spending limits while at the same time they realise the need to address 
mounting social pressures such as increasing levels of structural unemployment 
and poverty (Hemerijck 2014, p. 148). 
The complex system of multi-level policy coordination the EU has 
adopted since 2010 nevertheless raises profound concerns about the effects on 
national budgetary and policy-making autonomy and democratic 
accountability, as unelected supranational bodies such as the European 
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Commission and the European Central Bank have gained increasingly 
independent supervisory powers (Dyson 2012, p. 182; Borrell 2015, p.240; 
Hodson 2015, p. 188). Especially the Czech Republic, Hungary and also 
Slovakia have therefore adopted a more critical tone towards the eurozone's 
new political architecture. The Czech Republic adopted an increasingly 
eurosceptic attitude under during the presidency of Václac Klaus (2003-2013). 
Klaus repeatedly publicly expressed his scepticism towards what he considered 
to be plans for the establishment of an EU federation. This culminated when 
the German chancellor Angela Merkel attempted to convince EU partners to 
agree towards the inclusion of a binding debt brake into the existing treaty 
structure. The Czech Republic led by the centre-right government of prime 
minister Petr Nĕcas consequently joined the United Kingdom in opting out 
from the 2011 Fiscal Compact. Nĕcas did not follow British prime minister 
David Cameron in vetoing the inclusion of the Compact into the EU treaty 
structure. He nevertheless openly expressed his scepticism towards attempts to 
instil deeper political integration in the EU under crisis conditions (Král 2013). 
Hungary's prime minister Viktor Orbán has also been an outspoken critic of 
what he considers to be the EU's federalist direction under German leadership.  
Orbán expressed his euroscepticism by comparing the EU with the Soviet 
Stalinist interference during the Cold War and portraying it as a disturbing 
external influence (Agh 2012, p. 71 and 73) He has steered towards an 
increasingly nationalist direction and even questioned the fundamental values 
of the EU by proclaiming that Hungary's future would be that of an 'illiberal 
state' (Mahony 2014). Slovakia who had only just joined the euro surprised 
many EU partners when prime minister Iveta Radicova objected to the 
establishment of the EFSF in 2011 (Pidd 2011).  
 
New risk of reform fatigue 
 
These events illustrate growing levels of alienation in the CEE region 
from a process, where they are expected to contribute to financial support for 
countries who are considered to have failed to initiate essential structural 
domestic reforms. Given the current circumstances the euro outsiders amongst 
the CEEs are hence likely to continue the concentrate on improving economic 
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growth and living standards over convergence with the euro SGP criteria 
(Dyson and Marcussen 2009). There is therefore a real danger that the CEE 
countries start considering the EU 'on collision course with their political 
traditions, expectations and material interests' (Auer 2015). This danger 
presents itself in tandem with the growing division of the EU between the 
eurozone core and multiple peripheries. Both Southern Europe and the Central 
and Eastern European region are currently considered to be peripheries in the 
EU, mostly because of the lower levels of social cohesion (Galgoczi 2015). 
The latter manifests itself in noticeable divergence of wage levels, education 
standards and levels of poverty from the EU-15 average. Figure 3 shows the 
dilemma the majority of the CEE countries are facing. The latest comparative 
figures from 2013 on poverty and social exclusion in the EU illustrate that all 
but the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia have a higher percentage of 
people who are considered to be at the risk of poverty or social exclusion. The 
figures are particularly high in Bulgaria and Romania and the CEE-8 group is 
currently only exceeded by Greece. 
 
Figure 3: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion  
                 (% of total population) 
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Source: Eurostat, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pco
de=t2020_50&plugin=1 
 
Recent studies on the social and political development of the CEE 
region in the past twenty years emphasise that the countries in the region were 
caught by the global financial crisis in the process of incomplete welfare state 
transformation, which left them with persistently high levels of social 
exclusion. The aggravation of the social adjustment crisis risks endangering the 
relatively fragile democratisation in the CEEs, which is described as '"thin" 
Europeanization' (Agh 2013, p. 38). The backsliding of democracy in the CEE 
countries under crisis conditions in recent years, most noticeably in Hungary 
with incursions against independence of the media and judiciary and the rise of 
the popularity of the far-right Jobbik party (Birdwell et al 2013), in 
combination with unresolved social problems poses a substantial risk for the 
influence of the region in the EU in the long term. The main risk is that 
backtracking on political and social transformation successes may result in 'the 
increasing peripherialization of the ECE region with its sharply decreasing 
weight in the EU decision-making process' (Agh 2014,  p. 36).  
The risk of the spread of 'reform fatigue' in the CEE region is real as the 
decline in the public's trust in and satisfaction with the problem-solving 
capacity of national and EU-level politics increases. The High Level Reflection 
Group on Central Europe emphasises this risk but at the same time points out 
that so far the region has not witnessed an overall shift towards euroscepticism 
(High Level Reflection Group 2013, p. 28). A major factor which may 
contribute towards the rise in eurosceptic populist politics in the region is the 
ongoing discussion about alleged poverty and welfare migration from CEE 
countries towards the EU-15. 
This issue has been relentlessly pushed by the Conservative British 
prime minister Cameron in the context of his attempts to achieve the 
renegotiation of his country's EU membership. Cameron demands the 
renegotiation of the core Single Market principle of the free movement of 
people with the aim of permitting countries to impose permanent restrictions 
on the freedom of movement of citizens from other EU states. His focus in this 
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respect has been clearly on citizens from the new member states, especially 
Bulgaria and Romania: 'With their economies considerably poorer than ours – 
and with almost every other EU country opting to keep controls – it made the 
UK a uniquely attractive destination for the citizens of those countries' 
(Cameron 2014). Cameron claims that there has been a widespread abuse of 
the British welfare system by CEE migrants, a claim which is not backed up by 
actual figures (Nowaczek 2010, p. 295). These claims yet are discriminatory 
and ultimately politically dangerous as they feed the prejudiced view of the 
CEE countries as peripheral second-class members and fails to acknowledge 
the efforts they have made in their post-communist transformation. 
 
The enhanced Visegrád cooperation as an opportunity to avoid         
the peripheralisation trap? 
 
The CEEs will have to make concerted efforts to counter this stigmatisation as 
peripheral countries in the EU. A potentially crucial role in advocating the 
interests of the region and to generally raise the profile of the CEE members 
could potentially be taken up by the semi-institutionalised cooperation between 
the Visegrád 4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). The 
four have intensified their cooperation immediately after the fall of the iron 
curtain in 1991, when they began to coordinate their transition efforts in 
preparation for application for EU membership. The V4 cooperation remains 
loose and predominantly intergovernmental with only very limited 
supranational institutionalisation. The lack of rigid institutionalisation offers 
the opportunity for the V4 to swiftly adapt the format of their cooperation to 
new developments, including by adopting a V4+ format which allows outsiders 
to join the cooperation, such as has recently been the case with Austria (Töró et 
al 2014). The V4 cooperation nevertheless faces substantial constraints as it is 
frequently undermined by a divergence of national interests (such as most 
recently over the Ukraine crisis) and also the EU's general reluctance to 
officially recognise member state groupings (Kavický 2012, p.12). Under 
Polish leadership the V4 have taken an active role in the development of a 
number of EU initiatives, most of all in setting up the 2009 Eastern partnership 
under the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy and more recently in the 
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area of defence and security by planning to establish a Visegrád battlegroup 
(Šuplanta 2013). In spite of this the V4 have repeatedly been criticised for not 
being ambitious enough in making a concerted effort in establishing their 
cooperation as an agenda-setting mechanism which actively and openly 
promotes the interests of the wider CEE region (Fawn 2013, p. 348). The main 
persisting weakness of the V4 in this respect is the fact that it is still considered 
as 'a platform of choice and not necessity' (Töró et al 2014, p. 391).  That the 
V4 are capable of taking this choice when they consider their national interests 
to be at stake was shown when they united in their opposition against the 
German government’s approach towards the refugee crisis. The V4, who have 
traditionally been close partners of Germany, openly stood against the German 
government’s proposals for the introduction of a binding refugee quota system 
in the EU. The joint statement by the V4 prime ministers issued on 4 
September 2015 emphasised that they were supporting deeper EU cooperation 
on migration issues but only on the basis of voluntary participation of 
individual member states: ‘any proposal leading to introduction of mandatory 
permanent quota for solidarity measures would be unacceptable’ (V4 Trust 
2015, p. 3). The background to this is the persistent gap in the levels of social 
cohesion between the CEEs and the EU-15 which explains why the 
governments in the region are concerned about the influx of considerable 
migration which may aggravate existing social problems and pressures on 
domestic infrastructure and welfare states.  
 The V4 cooperation poses a particular dilemma for Poland as it 
tries to find a balance between its role as regional leader and its ambition to 
establish itself as strategic EU agenda-setter in a structural leading partnership 
with France and Germany. Poland has in recent years shown the determination 
to play an active part in shaping the future of the EU. In this respect it has been 
the expectation amongst the CEE group that Poland will act as V4 agenda-
setter. Since the departure of Donald Tusk as prime minister the Polish 
commitment to the V4 has however weakened. His successor Ewa Kopacz 
ultimately broke the V4 ranks at the special EU migration summit on 15 
October 2015 when she supported the German plan for the immediate 
distribution of refugees from Syria. Her decision to show greater openness 
towards the acceptance of refugees in Poland contributed to the massive defeat 
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of the Civic Platform at the Polish national election on 25 October 2015, which 
resulted in an absolute majority for the oppositional Law and Justice Party 
under the leadership of Beata Szydlo (Duval Smith 2015). The new 
government is strongly influenced by former prime minister Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski (Foy 2015)   and is therefore likely to pursue a nationalist and 
euroscepticist agenda.  (Wiatr 2013, p. 334). It is therefore doubtful if Poland 
under the new government will show the same commitment towards 
engagement in the V4 and in the EU as it did under its  predecessor. Continued 
Polish engagement and leadership will however be indispensable to strengthen 
the voice of the CEE countries in the EU in the future and to ensure that their 
interests are effectively promoted.  The EU is currently suffering from a 
deepening legitimacy crisis which predominantly results from the failure of the 
‘joint decision trap’, which effectively forces member state governments to 
reach unanimous decisions in the process of interstate bargaining in the 
Council (Scharpf 1988), to produce effective policy outcomes. The refugee 
crisis has once again illustrated that EU governments have for too long 
neglected the development of joint capabilities in strategic areas such as border 
control, asylum applications and also more generally the EU's external defence 
and security (Menon 2012). Like the eurozone crisis and the various external 
challenges the EU has been facing in recent years, the refugee crisis has also 
illustrated that Germany is increasingly overburdened with acting as the EU's 
'hegemonic stabiliser' (Bulmer and Paterson 2013, p. 1392; Schweiger 2015). 
Angela Merkel's 'cautious incrementalism' (Meiers 2015, p. 51) will not be 
sufficient in resolving the profound internal and external challenges the EU is 
facing. Germany therefore is in desperate need of strategic partners at a time 
when France is economically and politically weakened and the United 
Kingdom has once again started to retreat into splendid isolation. The CEE 
countries and particularly the Visegrád group with its close economic, cultural 
and political affiliation with Germany in principle offer Berlin such strategic 
partnerships. 
The CEEs have come a long way since they first joined the EU more 
than a decade ago but they are still learning to find their feet in the EU's 
increasingly complex intergovernmental diplomacy and multi-level system of 
decision-making. Poland is the only country of the CEE-10 who is potentially 
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able to exercise influence in the EU without the support of others in the region 
(Copeland 2014, p. 483). The CEE governments should make every effort to 
continue their domestic political, economic and social transformation processes 
with the long-term goal to abandon their status as periphery countries. The 
EU's current crisis is as much one of economic mismanagement as it is a crisis 
of overall political direction and purpose. This poses risks but also a unique 
opportunity for the CEE region. If it manages to avoid backsliding on the 
transition process already made and makes further progress towards the 
economic, political and social consolidation it will establish a viable fundament 
on which CEE interests can be actively promoted in the EU. An enhanced 
Visegrád cooperation, which stretches consultation and policy coordination 
across the region and externally promotes these interests by engaging in an 
active dialogue on the grand strategic issues facing the EU with other partners, 
could be the decisive factor in moving the status of the CEE members to a new 
level. 'More active policy-making and stronger shaping of the EU's future 
agenda' (High Level Reflection Group 2013, p. 47) between the CEEs and in 
close cooperation with their immediate neighbours such as Austria, the 
Scandinavian countries and most of all the crucial strategic partner and leading 
player Germany could make all the difference in achieving this transformation. 
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